Ⅲ ABSTRACT: Th is article draws on directed ethnographic research and a review of literature to explore how the commodifi cation of fi shing rights discursively and materially remakes human-marine relationships across diverse regions. It traces the history of dominant economic theories that promote the privatization of fi shing access for maximizing potential profi ts. It describes more recent discursive trends that link the ecological health of the world's oceans and their fi sheries to widespread privatization. Together, these economic and environmental discourses have enrolled a broad set of increasingly vocal and powerful privatization proponents. Th e article provides specifi c examples of how nature-society relationships among people, oceans, and fi sh are remade as privatization policies take root in fi shery systems. We conclude with an overview of several strategies of resistance. Across the world there is evidence of alternative discourses, economic logics, and cultures of fi shing resistant to privatization processes, the assumptions that underlie them, and the social transitions they oft en generate.
Ⅲ KEYWORDS: catch shares, fi sheries, individual transferable quotas (ITQs), political ecology, privatization Nation-states began privatizing fi shing rights on a large scale nearly four decades ago. Since that time, 35 nations have restructured major fi sheries, implementing nearly 400 access privatization programs to manage over 850 species (Environmental Defense Fund [EDF] 2012; Melnychuk et al. 2011) . We use the term privatization to signify a variety of processes that redefi ne access rights or privileges to open, common, or state-owned fi sheries. While true privatization implies "assigning clear, legally enforceable private property rights to hitherto unowned, state-owned, or communally owned aspects of the social, cultural, and/or natural worlds" (Castree 2010: 10), we use the term here to describe many processes that increase the level of private allocation of, and control over, public resources. Privatization of fi shing rights oft en involves new processes of marketization, creating mechanisms for the monetary exchange or transfer of fi shing rights or privileges between individuals, corporations, or other collectives, and relatedly, commodifi cation, reshaping the access rights to fi sh into objects that can be bought and sold.
Th ere is a range of variation in the nature of privatization, marketization, and commodifi cation processes in various fi shery systems worldwide. A consistent step in these diverse privatization processes is the private allocation of resource rights, oft en in the form of "individual fi shing quotas. " Th ese individual fi shing quotas usually confer to fi shermen, fi shing companies, or less frequently communities or collectives the right to fi sh for a certain portion of a total catch limit. Approximately 80 percent of all individual fi shing quota programs worldwide allocate fi shing rights as tradable commodities (Bonzon et al. 2010) , and are oft en thus named, individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Among fi shermen, scientists, managers, and interested citizens, ITQs have been, and continue to be, deeply polarizing. Agnar Helgason and Gísli Pálsson (1998: 131) note that "the ITQ system has become one of the most contentious and tumultuous issues in Icelandic political history. " Th e US Congress put a moratorium on ITQs for almost a decade in response to widespread concern about the equity issues that result from fi sheries privatization. A growing environmental discourse advocating for individual fi shing quotas, or "catch shares, " for environmental conservation goals has recently reinvigorated privatization processes.
As Petter Holm and Kåre Nolde Nielsen (2007: 193) note, the "ITQ literature is massive. " Several syntheses of this burgeoning literature provide helpful reviews of a wide range of ITQ case studies (e.g., Shotton 2000a Shotton , 2000b Shotton , 2001 , the relationship between catch shares and fi sh resources (e.g., Chu 2009; Costello et al. 2008; Melnychuk et al. 2011) , and the social impacts of fi sheries privatization (e.g., Copes 1986; Lowe and Carothers 2008; McCay 1995 McCay , 2004 Olson 2011; Pálsson and Pétursdóttir 1996) . Th is article, contributing to a volume on capitalism and the environment, does not attempt to provide an exhaustive review of this literature, but focuses instead on exploring how the privatization, marketization, and commodifi cation processes in fi shery systems discursively and materially remake human-marine relationships across diverse regions. Th e article is informed by previous and current directed ethnographic study of fi sheries privatization processes in Alaska and Iceland. 1 It traces the history of economic theories that promoted the privatization of fi shing access for maximizing potential profi ts from common property fi sheries. It then describes more recent discursive trends that link the ecological health of the world's oceans and their fi sheries to the widespread implementation of private property rights. Together, these economic and environmental discourses have enrolled a broad set of increasingly vocal and powerful privatization proponents. Next, it tempers this enthusiasm for privatization with a detailed look at how nature-society relationships among people, oceans, and fi sh are "remade" (Braun and Castree 1998; Heynen et al. 2007 ; Mansfi eld 2008) as privatization policies take root in fi shery systems. Th e article concludes with a presentation of several strategies of resistance to this reframing and remaking of fi shery systems.
Fish and Property: Tragedies, Crises, and the Inevitability of Privatization
Increasingly in both academic and popular literature, the fate of the world's fi sh stocks is linked to the widespread privatization of fi shing rights (e.g., Costello et al. 2008; EDF 2012; Festa et al. 2008; Weiss 2008) . Environmental Defense Fund, a leading US environmental nongovernmental organization (NGO), has recently created a catch shares design center and manual, including a seven-step process for creating new privatization programs (Bonzon et al. 2010) . Its website prominently displays the more than fourfold increase in the number of ITQ programs in eff ect worldwide since 1990 (EDF 2012) . Th e enthusiasm for fi sheries privatization is easily perceivable in scientifi c literature and conferences. At the International Marine Conservation Congress (of the Society for Conservation Biology) held in Washington DC, in 2009, for example, a speaker introduced his presentation about the benefi ts of catch shares in fi sheries management by showing an image of two small boys drinking a single milkshake with two straws. As he explained, in the absence of separate glasses that would fairly divide their shares, the kids are doomed to compete for the precious milkshake, each trying to drink as much of it as he can before the other. Like many popular stories about shared resources, this story also ends in tragedy. As the presenter explains, rather than enjoying their milkshake at a leisurely pace, both boys end up experiencing a painful ice cream headache. To many conservation scientists in the room that day, the link between two children "competing for" a milkshake and fi sheries management needed little explanation. Th e tragedy of the commons narrative (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968) has been so overused in describing the problems of fi sheries management that today it is not presented as an empirical question but rather as dogma. According to this tale, fi shermen-in the absence of private property rights, acting as self-interested, competing, and profi t-seeking individuals or businesses-race to outfi sh their fellow fi shermen, securing as much of an open access resource as possible, ending in ruin for all, both the fi shermen and the fi sh.
Why has this tragedy of the commons problem and property-rights-solution framing become such a potent and dominant discourse? Networks of scientists, fi shing industry leaders, advocacy groups, and policymakers that have historically, and are currently, promoting catch shares have complex rationales. However, two points appear central to understanding the recent fervor for catch shares. First, the discourses of fi sheries privatization, as presented by neoclassical economists, appear as common-sense facts, articulating well with processes of management that strive for objective science informing policy (Wingard 2000) . Neoclassical economics provides to capitalist logics the scientifi c abstraction and mathematical modeling that make these logics appear to be natural, defi ning features of human society (Davis 1996; Polanyi 1944; Wilk 1996) . Th eoretical abstraction has made the privatization of fi sheries appear as inevitable progress in fi sheries management across diverse political processes. Second, the enrollment of a diverse set of actors, promoting much broader goals than aggregate profi t maximization, including resource conservation, has made it increasingly common to link fi sheries privatization to a host of positive outcomes. Within this broadening of goals has also come a powerful linkage with crisis narratives of overfi shing. Scientists, conservationists, and diverse publics are now being told that without enclosure and privatization, fi sheries are bound to collapse (e.g., Costello et al. 2008 , Weiss 2008 .
Economic Science and Capitalist Logic: Privatization for Rent Maximization
Th e (economics) profession's most important policy achievement must surely be its infl uence on getting the ITQs on the agenda as a viable policy instrument.
- Wilen (2000: 321, cited in Holm and Nielsen 2007: 176) Th e tragedy of the commons framing of fi sheries was fi rst clearly articulated in scientifi c literature in the 1950s. Resource economists noted that open access fi sheries managed only biologically for total catch limits did not generate any aggregate profi ts, or resource rents, as did land and other natural resources. If enclosed by private property rights, fi sheries could generate maximum profi ts for fi rms or profi t-seeking individuals that were shared too widely under common property regimes (Anderson 1976 ). H. Scott Gordon (1954) was among the fi rst to specifi cally defi ne the absence of private property rights as the key problem of fi sheries, and Francis Christy (1973) the fi rst to set out individually allocated "fi shermen's quotas" as a solution. Many scholars have since provided critical reviews of this economic framing of fi sheries (e.g., Acheson 1981; Carothers 2008; Davis 1996; Bromley 2002, 2004; Macinko and Shumann 2008; Mansfi eld 2004 Mansfi eld , 2008 McEvoy 1986; Reiser 1999; St. Martin 2005 , 2007a , 2007b , and others have off ered a more general critique of such framings that obscure a wide range of successfully managed commons worldwide (e.g., Ciriacy-Wanthrup and Bishop 1975; McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom et al. 2002) . According to neoclassical economic theory-in the absence of property rights-a "persistent and inevitable" process ensues whereby fi shermen work to outcompete each other for their catches of fi sh, thus investing in "unproductive labor and capital" and "dissipating" all potential resource rents possible from the natural reproductive fi sh stocks (Moloney and Pearse 1979: 860) . Th e solution is to eliminate the "totally useless accumulation of excess capital" (Crutchfi eld 1979: 751) and labor (i.e., fi shing boats, gear, and fi shermen) to enclose the fi sheries for fewer individuals and vessels thus maximizing profi ts for the fl eet that remains. Th e social goal of fi sheries according to this economic framing is to maximize aggregate profi t for the most effi cient fi shermen or fi rms. Th ese goals of effi ciency and profi t are presented as natural facts of human society, refl ecting the close connection between neoclassical economics and capitalism (Polanyi 1944; Wilk 1996) . Market mechanisms are seen to be more neutral than democratic processes because they "get the politics out" of fi sheries management and provide for the primary goal of fi shery systems in a capital-centric imaginary-the "maximization of economic benefi t in the long term" (Hannesson 2006: 161) .
Since the 1950s, resource economists have developed increasingly sophisticated models for representing optimal allocations of fi shing eff ort to maximize profi ts. A common framing of fi sheries privatization by fi shery managers and scientists is that the so-called technical realities of the global crisis of too many boats chasing too few fi sh demand rationalist management measures such as privatization, oft en termed "rationalization" by fi sheries economists and managers. Because economists tend to use value-neutral language backed by abstract and highly specialized representations, they oft en more easily align with policy processes that prioritize objectivity and attempt to erase the political dimensions of management. Bourdieu (1999: 165) reminds us that once relegated to a body of specialists, certain discourses can gain a "monopoly of legitimate cultural production. " In many regions, the economic discourse of fi sheries privatization has gained an ideological and commonsensical power that has obscured its normative framing. Th is power may, in part, explain the widespread adoption of fi sheries privatization policies.
Expanded Goals: Fate of Oceans Linked to Privatization
Strikingly, current proponents of fi sheries privatization do not oft en cite rent maximization as a primary goal. Th e Environmental Defense Fund (2012), for example, states that catch shares can "bring back fi sh populations, save commercial fi shing jobs, ensure fi shing communities prosper and thrive, preserve our fi shing heritage, and attract new participants. " Conservation of fi sh stocks is fi rst among these benefi ts and is increasingly used as a rationale for fi sheries privatization in both academic and popular media and discourse. Th e New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Economist popularized the fi ndings of Christopher Costello, Steven Gaines, and John Lynham (2008) presented in Science: "privatization prevents collapse of fi sh stocks. " If ITQs transfer a secure property right to individuals, some argue that those ownership rights will foster a conservation ethic among participants who, as owners, want the fi shery resources to remain healthy over the long term for their own benefi t (e.g., Hannesson 2005; NOAA Fisheries Service 2012). However, this relationship between privatization and conservation has oft en been theoretically assumed (e.g., Festa et al. 2008; Fujita and Bonzon 2006) , rather than empirically documented (Brandon 2004) .
Recent studies have attempted to make up for the lack of investigation of the link between ITQs and increased resource conservation (e.g., Chu 2009; Costello et al. 2008, Heal and Schlenker 2008; Melnychuk et al. 2011 ), but no simple relationship emerges from this literature. Some authors conclude that ITQs confer benefi ts to fi sh stocks (e.g., Costello et al. 2008) ; others show how stock declines occur years aft er ITQ implementation (e.g., Copes and Pálsson 2000) . Several factors appear to aff ect the relationship between ITQs and fi shery stocks, including the association between total catch limits and division of those limits into ITQs, the property relationship conferred by ITQs, and the fi shing practices generated by ITQs. First, the distinctions between various types of quotas are important to consider. Among nonspecialists, the discourse of ITQs may imply that what is being implemented with individual fi shing quotas are limits on overall harvests, which have obvious conservation goals. However, the point of ITQs is to divide up (e.g., among individuals, fi rms, or other collectives) a total, fl eetwide catch quota, that is usually set with biological and ecological considerations in mind. Total catch limits are set and enforced in many fi sheries managed without ITQs, and have been eff ective in some ITQ fi sheries long before individual quota implementation. A recent study of 345 privatized access fi sheries concludes that while catch share programs tend to decrease overexploitation, that "appears to be due more to the presence of a fl eet-wide quota cap than to the division of that quota into shares" (Melnychuk et al. 2011) . Th is is a key point. Setting and enforcing total catch limits has obvious benefi ts for fi sh stocks. Individually dividing up that total catch limit into tradable commodities has less clear eff ects on fi sh stocks.
A second confusing issue that is oft en glossed over in pro-catch shares discourses is the actual property rights or privileges conferred by ITQs. As Daniel Bromley (2008) notes, there is much "conceptual confusion" about the theory and practice of ITQs. In the economic discourse described above, the closer ITQs are to true resource privatization the better (Hannesson 2006) . True privatization-according to these theories-implies stable, clearly defi ned ownership rights, free transferability, and long-term planning possibilities, thus setting the stage for the increased effi ciency and rent maximization, the economic goals that provide the impetus for ITQs in the fi rst place. In the environmental discourse, those who link resource stewardship to ITQs do so under the assumption that real property rights engender a conservation ethic. Oddly, the broader set of proponents of ITQs, including environmental NGOs and fi shery managers, tend not to employ the language of privatization. According to Macinko and Bromley: "It is common for IFQ proponents in the United States to reassure a nervous public that they aren't privatizing anything-they are simply advocating what they consider to be the best management tool. Yet proponents then lapse into justifi cations for IFQs that are thoroughly predicated upon a logic in which privatization is not only benefi cial but also necessary" (2002: 21). In the United States, ITQs are defi ned as revocable access privileges without legal liability, recently described as being conferred in "(revocable) perpetuity" (Abbott et al. 2010) . In Iceland, ITQs are permanent shares of a total catch quota, although the Icelandic Supreme Court has ruled ITQs are not equal to private property rights in perpetuity (Hannesson 2006: 78) , and a 2012 bill before the Icelandic Parliament aims to defi ne the longevity of ITQ rights. In New Zealand, ITQs are perhaps closest to private property, because they are awarded in (actual) perpetuity; and in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, long-term rights are not conferred by ITQs (Shotton et al. 2001) .
Th ird, the actual fi shing practices employed in ITQ fi sheries demand exploration if any conclusions about ITQs and resource health are to be drawn. Parzival Copes (2000) discusses both how ITQ systems in general, and the various specifi c fi shing practices such systems may encourage (e.g., high-grading, or selectively choosing to fi ll an individual quota with premium fi sh while discarding suboptimal fi sh), can create negative impacts on fi shery stocks. Th e practice of leasing quota share from owners by fi shermen is common in many ITQ fi sheries. Th ose captains and crew who directly interact with the fi sh oft en do not own rights to the resource; thus predictions about how they will or will not behave for the long-term interest of that resource are not straightforward. For example, disenfranchised captains and crew members who resent such leasing practices (e.g., Lazrus et al. 2011 ) cannot be assumed to employ fi shing practices with long-term resource sustainability in mind. Th e rural-to-urban migration of ITQs also demands attention. Th ose individuals who reside in coastal communities, who may well be more concerned about the long-term health of their marine ecosystems than those nonlocals who migrate in and out only for commercial fi shing, are oft en dispossessed of fi shing rights aft er resource privatization . Th e diversity of practices catalyzed by ITQs demands attention before broad generalizations about ITQs and resource outcomes are made.
Each of these points demonstrates the unclear relationship between privatization and resource conservation. Despite these ambiguous relationships, the discursive linking of fi sheries privatization to environmental stewardship and ecosystem health (as well as other goals, such as increased human safety 2 ) has had important implications. In the language of actor network theory (Callon 1986; Latour 1987) , the expanded goals of fi sheries access privatization have successfully enrolled important actors in fi sheries and marine management and conservation networks. Within this expanded environmental discourse, resistance to privatization is increasingly imagined not as resistance to dominant cultural logics that promote the marketization and commodifi cation of fi shing rights for maximizing profi t, but to the environmental logics that are redefi ning a new environmentalism of marine ecosystems. Th is emerging environmental discourse has constructed privatization processes, both of access rights to extractive fi sheries and of marine spaces, as necessary precursors for protecting ecosystem integrity and health. Th ese discourses have mobilized environmental activists, marine recreationalists, coastal tourists, and seafood consumers to support privatization processes. ITQs have now been reframed as "catch shares. " Th e individual and tradable nature of the resource rights that defi ned the economic framing is no longer central to this environmental discourse, in which catch shares are the "new hope for fi sheries" and a "real investment in sustainability" (EDF 2012: n.p.).
From Inevitable Natural Logics to Capitalist Production Systems
Th e dominance of the tragedy of the commons metaphor in both economic and environmental discourses, paired with the requisite privatization of access rights to fi shing, has gained such commonsense status in international fi sheries science and management that it is oft en discussed in terms of its inevitability (Árnason 1993; Hannesson 2006) . For example, a fi shery manager in Alaska described the push for fi sheries privatization, oft en called "rationalization" in this region, in Kodiak in March 2006: "We had a situation, worldwide, where people in fi sheries are having an increasing race for fi sh … more and more boats, more and more people, more and more technology and gear going aft er the same number of fi sh. And worldwide there has been a lot of variation, but there's been one form or another of rationalization. " In addition to articulating the perceived inevitability of fi sheries management regimes moving toward privatizing fi sheries, this statement presents the problems of fi sheries as a technical one of too much steel and too few fi sh. Missing here, and oft en in both economic and environmental discourses, is the key point that this "race for fi sh" is not a technical problem created by individual, unconnected human behavior presented in the tragedy of the commons story, but rather a political economic problem created by larger-scale processes of global capitalism and industrial fi sheries.
Utilizing a political ecology framework, Becky Mansfi eld (2010) provides an overview of both the critique of tragedy of the commons framings and the industrial fi sheries development that has led to global fi sheries crises. As she notes, overfi shing is not caused by the human propensity for individual greed, but rather industrial processes that have modernized and developed fi sheries in recent decades. Th e scale of industrial fi sheries became massive in the 1960s and 1970s; technological development enabled fi shing fl eets in the US, UK, Spain, Japan, and Russia, to travel farther and catch and process more fi sh (McGoodwin 1990) . During this development, Mansfi eld also notes the inequitable fl ow of resource wealth of fi sheries from developing to developed countries. Nearly three-quarters of all fi sh traded internationally comes from nations in the Global South exported for consumption in nations in the Global North, over 70 percent of which is for markets in the European Union, Japan, and the United States. Overfi shing in the Global South is caused in large part by export commodity markets and the demand generated in these wealthier countries (Mansfi eld 2010).
Rather than an inevitable process, we see industrial fi sheries developing for specifi c reasons. Fisheries were targeted as an underdeveloped realm for increased economic growth. In the United States, federal policies aimed at developing fi shing capacity in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a near doubling of commercial fi shing vessels in the country between the mid-1960s and 1980s, accounting for two-and-a-half times more fi sh harvested between the 1970s and 1990s (Wingard 2000) . Large-scale subsidies fi nanced between 50 and 87 percent of costs for constructing or refurbishing fi shing vessels, shore-based infrastructure, and marketing (Mansfi eld 2010; Wingard 2000) . Today, approximately US$16 billion are spent on increasing fi shing capacity worldwide, and US$4-US$8 billion are spent on fuel subsidies (Mansfi eld 2010).
Rather than situate overfi shing in a global system of uneven development that generates large-scale extraction, cheap products, inequitable fl ows of resource wealth from south to north (Mansfi eld 2010), both economic and environmental narratives tend to link overfi shing to inevitable human nature (tragedy of the commons). Th ese discourses, paired with the striking statistics of the overfi shing that has resulted from the industrialization of fi sheries, where 32 percent of all stocks are estimated to be "overexploited, depleted, or recovering, " 50 percent are fully exploited, 12 percent moderately exploited, and 3 percent underexploited (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] 2010: 35), have created a fertile context for fi sheries restructuring. Yet, the overfi shing problem constructed in this way as one of individual human greed, paired with a solution of privatization, leaves unimagined alternatives that would actually address the root causes of overfi shing-the industrialization and uneven development of fi shery systems.
Remaking Nature-Society Relationships
Social scientists have increasingly explored relationships between the environment and privatization (e.g., Heynen et al. 2007; McCarthy and Prudham 2004) . Building on the work of Karl Marx, scholars have explored how privatization processes and the new property relationships they create oft en dispossess people from land, sea, and resources, such that they are forced to labor for the owners of capital and newly created commodities (Mansfi eld 2010). Wealth is oft en accumulated through these processes of dispossession (Harvey 2003) . In the fi sheries context, the connection between the economic theories that promote the privatization of fi sheries access and wealth accumulation is explicit. Th e point of resource privatization-as described in economics literature from the 1950s to the present-is to maximize potential profi ts, or resource rents, by eliminating so-called wasteful labor and capital. Processes of privatization are oft en conceived of as inevitable processes for those employing capitalist logics, so alternatives are left unimagined in this economic literature (Carothers 2008; Davis 1996; St. Martin 2007a) , except in cases of perceived extreme diff erence, such as indigenous fi sheries or fi sheries in isolated communities, where more attention might be paid to fi shing as a way-of-life rather than as a profi t-generating endeavor (e.g., Crutchfi eld 1979: 751) . Th e environmental logics that promote the privatization of resource rights and marine space for preserving marine ecosystems also generate dispossessions. For example, prioritizing uses of marine spaces for scientifi c research and maritime recreation in marine reserves over extractive fi shing redefi nes legitimate uses of marine resources and spaces and oft en reframes fi shing as a practice that threatens ecosystem structure and function.
Th e question we explore in this section is how privatization processes remake nature-society relationships in fi shery systems. Scholars like Bruce Braun and Noel Castree (1999) , Becky Mans-fi eld (2004, 2008, 2010) , and Julia Olson (2011) , who write about the ways in which enclosure and privatization processes remake nature-society relationships, are careful to caution against broad-brushed generalizations. As many case studies of fi sheries privatization in diverse contexts reveal, places, peoples and natures vary considerably, as do the specifi c impacts of restricting, commodifying, and marketizing fi shing rights. Yet some general trends are observable when comparing processes of fi sheries access privatization across the globe. Olson presents an impressive review of the social impacts of fi sheries privatization and the "new ways of organizing around fi shing" (2011: 353) that emerge once privatization policies are enacted. Olson documents cases in the US, Canada, Iceland, Norway, and Australia, describing the diverse impacts of privatization based on national approach, fi shery, and social context; however, a key fi nding presented is that "negative impacts from privatization oft en fall on less powerful segments of the fi shing industry, namely the crew, or the small business owners" (Ibid.: 361). Th ose best able to reap the benefi ts of new programs, larger fi rms or vertically integrated corporations, come to redefi ne the structure of fi sheries-by leasing out rights and shift ing hiring and compensation practices for captains and crews, and of fi shing communities and regions that are made up of those captains and crews among other fi shery participants (Olson 2011) .
Initial Allocation, Market Trading, and Concentration of Wealth and Power
Several scholars use the concept of experimentation to describe the implementation of ITQs (e.g., Copes and Pálsson 2000; Helgason and Pálsson 1998; Olson 2011; Reiser 1999) . Resource economists and marine scientists oft en view nature as something essentially manageable, and ITQs are a direct extension of this notion (Pálsson and Helgason 1996) . Common outcomes of fi sheries privatization are fully predicted to occur according to the economic theories that promote it, including the concentration of wealth derived from fi shing. Among the fi rst steps in privatization processes is allocating the newly defi ned fi shing rights. ITQs have been most commonly allocated to boat owners (individuals, fi rms, or in some fi sheries, vessels), even in fi sheries where hired skippers are common. Th is common practice is based on a capital-centric logic of rewarding those who have invested fi nancially in fi sheries, rather than with their labor; "vessel owners and lease holders are the participants who supply the means to harvest fi sh, suff er the fi nancial and liability risks to do so, and direct the fi shing operations" (NOAA Fisheries Service 1993: 59378). An exception is the Bering Sea crab fi shery privatized in 2005 that allocated hired captains some fi shing quota, although collectively they received only 3 percent of the total fi shing quota. In many other fi sheries, hired skippers and crew received no portion of the newly created wealth, oft en generating much ill will between boat owners and operators. Th ese tensions contributed to an anti-ITQ movement among fi shermen in the US, resulting in a seven-year moratorium on ITQs (McCay 2001; see also Criddle and Macinko 2000) .
Th e proportion of the total catch allocated to owners or vessels in an ITQ system is usually based on past catch levels in the fi shery. Th ese historic catches oft en refl ect an average catch of a vessel over a short range of years (Shotton 2001) . Th is pattern of allocating fi shing rights based on the percentages of catch within a set number of years has catalyzed a phenomenon where fi shermen fi sh for "fi shing history" in fi sheries they expect to become privatized (Copes and Pálsson 2000; Maurstad 2000) . In the Alaska halibut fi shery, for example, Clarence Pautkze and Chris Oliver (1997: n.p.) note that "eff ort pour [ed] in to establish a fi shing history and rights to what probably w[ould] be a permit of considerable value. " In this fi shery, as in many others, those boats that caught the most fi sh and most contributed to the problems of overcapacity in need of restriction were rewarded with the most fi shing rights. Bonnie McCay (2001) notes that even the "catch history" for illegally harvested clams was used to determine future fi shing rights in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States.
Economic theories predict that those who are most effi cient (e.g., have lower costs and make higher profi ts) will buy out those less effi cient fi shermen (see, e.g., Árnason 1993; Crutchfi eld 1979; Hannesson 2006) . Th e market mechanism creates a space that favors those who are economically effi cient and have access to capital (Eythórsson 1996) . Th ose most effi cient with access to capital are oft en large, vertically integrated fi rms (Copes and Charles 2004; McCay et al. 1995; Pálsson and Helgason 1995) . In Iceland, consolidation of quotas occurred quickly in the fi rst four years aft er ITQ implementation (Pálsson and Helgason 1995) . In 2009, the 5 largest fi shing companies held 33 percent of all fi shing quota and the 20 largest held 66 percent (Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries 2011). Over the course of a decade, ITQs held in New Zealand fi sheries consolidated substantially. By 1996, 86 percent of total catch quotas were owned by the 12 largest companies (Stewart et al. 2006) . Individual ownership limits in New Zealand are currently among the highest worldwide. An individual fi rm may own as much as 35 to 45 percent of total quota in a fi shery, limits that do not allow an outright monopoly but provide for an oligopoly of control by a few companies (Stewart and Callagher 2011) . Dramatic consolidation has occurred in some ITQ fi sheries in the US. For example, the fl eet of vessels participating in the Bering Sea red king crab and snow crab fi sheries in 2004 shrunk by 63 percent and 58 percent respectively during the fi rst full year of ITQ management (2005 and 2006 respectively); currently, both fl eets number just over 30 percent of their pre-ITQs highs (Abbott et al. 2010) . In some fi sheries, limits on consolidation and fi shing quota linked to vessel-size classes have prevented widespread wealth concentration (Fina 2011; National Research Council [NRC] 1999a) .
Fleet consolidation oft en translates into a direct loss of jobs, especially for nonquota owning captains and crew. Job loss can be rapid, as in the Bering Sea crab fi sheries where approximately 70 percent of crew jobs were eliminated with the privatization of fi sheries access rights (Abbott et al. 2010) . Economists assume those less effi cient quota shareholders are properly compensated because they sell their fi shing quota, and moreover, they better serve society because their labor is assumed to be mobile and can be better put toward other ends (Hannesson 2004 ). However, several case studies take issue with these conclusions, noting instead the role that culture and economic stress can play in bringing about the sale of fi shing rights by those who highly value them (e.g., Carothers 2010 , and that labor and capital based in communities is oft en not mobile (Davis 1996) . Gunnar Knapp (2011) recently demonstrated in Alaska salmon fi sheries that as the value of a fi shery increases, the level of local ownership decreases. Low-income and indigenous fi shermen tend to be more likely to sell ITQs in the Alaska halibut fi shery and less likely to purchase them (Carothers in press; Carothers et al. 2010) . Th ese trends have led to a rural-to-urban migration of fi shing quota out of small (under 1,500 people), remote coastal communities in the Gulf of Alaska region; the number of rural fi shermen in this region that hold halibut quota has decreased by 40 percent and the number of rural halibut quota share holdings has decreased by 56 percent since 1995 (NOAA Fisheries Service 2010). In Iceland, a similar rural-to-urban shift in fi shing ownership and operation has occurred. Vertical integration of fi shing companies and the increasing scale of fi shing vessels and processing plants has limited employment options for fi shermen and processing workers in rural communities.
Olson (2011) notes privatization is not always accompanied by consolidation or an increasing concentration of wealth. In the case of Australian South East Trawl fi shery privatized during a time of wide unemployment and uncertainty about future fi shing prospects, the number of fi shers remained fairly constant (Connor and Alden 2001) . New Zealand fl eets expanded aft er the implementation of ITQs largely due to state support of off shore fi shing capacity (Olson 2011 ).
If ITQs lengthen fi shery seasons, other fi shery sectors may increase employment opportunities, for example in the processing and support business sectors (Olson 2011) . Contrary to these common trends of the concentration of fi shing rights more inequitably in increasingly fewer hands, individually allocated fi shing rights can also be used as equalizers of wealth. Th e Norwegian implementation of ITQs in 1990, for example, provided for equivalent incomes for boat-owning fi shermen; however, equity issues were created for those without boats (Olson 1997 (Olson , 2011 .
Changes in Fishing Relations and Practices
Some of these quota lords are friends of mine. And they kind of know the deal, but they're caught in this whole capitalist thing … I've given up on the halibut and the black cod fi shery. It's just a lost fi shery to me at this point. You know, chasing -allowing myself to get Q-teased.
-Interview with a Kodiak fi sherman (July 2011) Kevin St. Martin (e.g., 2005 , 2007a , 2007b has explored processes of capitalism and "noncapitalism" in New England fi sheries. He explores how the use of a share, or lay, system of compensation as distinct from wages is characteristic of alternative economic arrangements that characterize many fi shing systems. Fishing crew members, like captains and owner-operators are usually compensated for their labor in catching fi sh (and other vessel and shore-based work) by sharing in the earnings of the catch (minus some shared expenses, commonly including groceries, fuel, and bait) rather than a per hour, day, or trip wage (McCay 1995; St. Martin 2008) . In many cases, the privatization of fi shing access has restructured similar share systems, oft en dramatically reducing the shares paid to crew. Prior to the implementation of ITQs in the US North Pacifi c halibut fi shery, for example, crew members collectively earned a share of the gross profi ts up to 70 percent. Aft er the implementation of halibut ITQs, this crew percentage has dropped to 33 percent (Rosvold 2007) . Th ough economic analyses of these shift s point out that crew earnings rose with the increased value of halibut following the introduction of ITQs (Hartley and Fina 2001; Herrmann and Criddle 2006) , a much larger percentage of the rent generated by access privatization went to quota owners. Prior to the privatization of the Bering Sea crab fi sheries in 2005, crew members collectively tended to receive approximately 35 percent of gross vessel revenues; this percentage dropped to 23 percent by 2010 (Fina 2011) . Public testimony given by crab crew members suggest that some vessels in these fi sheries maintain historic crew percentages, but other boats have dropped their individual crew shares from 5-6 percent to 0.5-2 percent aft er ITQ implementation (Dochtermann, personal communication, 2012) . In these fi sheries, Abbott and colleagues (2010: 333) fi nd that "both seasonal and daily employment remuneration increased substantially for many crew" aft er the privatization of the fi shery, although earnings per crab caught decreased "as a result of increased crew productivity and the necessity of paying for fi shing quota in the new system. " Evelyn Pinkerton and Danielle Edwards (2009) note a shift in crew shares from 10-20 percent in Canada to 1-5 percent post-ITQ implementation in the British Columbia halibut fi shery. Although the value of that fi shery has increased about 25 percent over the last 20 years, the proportion of value of the fi shery going to crew members has dropped by over 70 percent. One primary rationale for the decreasing shares given to crew members in privatized fi sheries is the widespread practice of quota leasing and deducting ITQ "costs" from vessel earnings before crew shares are paid. Pinkerton and Edwards (2009) refer to quota leasing in the British Columbia halibut fi shery as the elephant in the room because nearly 80 percent of all quota in this fi shery is leased, yet these practices have received relatively little analysis. Lease prices doubled between 1993 and 2008, reaching 78 percent of the total value of the catch (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009 ). In the Bristol Bay red king crab fi shery, lease fees can reach approximately 70 percent (Lazrus et al. 2011) . Deductions for the ITQ costs have risen in this fi shery from 40 percent in 2005 to 80 percent in 2006 and 2007; approximately 80 percent of vessels deduct ITQ costs from crew shares (Abbott et al. 2010) , although the practice of charging for initially allocated "owned quota, " or the "opportunity costs" of ITQs is still considered unfair by many quota owners (Abbott et al. 2010; Lazrus et al. 2011 ). In the halibut fi shery, rates of ITQ deductions have been one of "decelerating acceleration, " as one Kodiak fi sherman noted. "At fi rst people weren't charging anything, then it was 20 percent, 50 percent, 60 percent, 65 percent. So it went up pretty fast in the fi rst few years. When people started buying it then they had debt service, so they're fi nancing it with a piece off the top" (interview with a Kodiak fi sherman, April 2011).
In Iceland, as quota accumulated in the hands of larger companies, small-scale fi shermen were oft en forced to lease quota from them (Helgason and Pálsson 1997; Helgason 1995, 1996) . Fishermen were placed under the direct control of the companies in terms of wages earned. In Icelandic fi shing discourse, fi shermen became "tenants" who were "fi shing for others" under control of the "lords of the sea. " In British Columbia, quota owners oft en charge their lease fees through middlemen like processing plants because of the ethical issues they have with charging such fees directly to fi shermen (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009) . Some fi sheries privatization programs, such as those in Australia do not prohibit outside investors from buying quota share; this practice further removes fi shermen from ownership (Bradshaw 2004; Copes and Charles 2004; Pálsson and Helgason 1995) . Helgason and Pálsson (1997) suggest that the increase in the prevalence of quota share leasing marks a shift in the nature of fi shing rights such as individual transferable quotas. Th is practice of profi t making from fi shing rights without fi shing shows that ITQs are "not just use-rights, but, in eff ect, property rights that could be exchanged solely for profi t" (Helgason and Pálsson 1997: 457 ; see also Karlsdóttir 2008) .
In several ITQ fi sheries the crew share system has entirely shift ed to a wage system (e.g., British Columbia halibut and the Tasmanian rock lobster fi shery [Olson 2011]) . Recent interviews in Kodiak suggest that some captains in the Alaska halibut and other ITQ fi sheries are employing more wage workers as fi shermen operating outside of the customary share system. Th ese workers, commonly called "$100/day guys, " are oft en viewed negatively by long-term crew members used to being part of a share system they see as being eroded by the new restructuring that accompanies access privatization. Th is practice refl ects to some crew members a devaluing of their knowledge and skills.
Th ese shift s in compensation practices, while not universally negative for all crew in all ITQ fi sheries, do further institutionalize and legitimate uneven distributions of wealth that fl ow from fi sheries, particularly resource rent created by privatization processes. In many ITQ fi sheries the value of the ITQs refl ects real costs for operators who have purchased or leased quotas, or opportunity costs for those who were originally allocated quotas. Th e owners of the capital have realized increased benefi t and power, while the labor class has become less able to obtain ownership of their own means of production. Th e changing nature of fi shing relationships in many ITQ fi sheries has substantially decreased upward labor mobility, oft en creating impassable class divisions. In many ITQ fi sheries, it is not a realistic expectation that a fi shing crew member could become a fi shing captain or boat and quota owner. Th e added capitalization of fi shing rights has severely eroded options for crew members or new entrants who cannot aff ord them (e.g., Lowe and Carothers 2008; Yandle and Dewees 2008) .
Th e further entrenching of class roles has shift ed the power relationships in fi shing. In Alaska ITQ fi sheries, long-term crew members describe being "Q-teased. " Crew may dedicate boat and gear labor time for the promise of a crew position on a future ITQ trip that may not materialize, or may be off ered work as a crew member in other less lucrative fi sheries with the potential for ITQ trips in the future. For some long-term crew members, new feelings of dependency on "quota lords" for employment, and uncertain employment, is not worth the promise of potential earnings. In a July 2011 interview, one Kodiak fi sherman described this in terms of power shift s: "you no longer have any power as a crewman … the power shift ed away … from the people that actually do the work. "
Changes in Communities, Cultures, and Economies
Th e smaller operators and, it seems, the majority of Icelanders vehemently object to the new commodity identity of fi shing rights. Th e transformation of the social identity of fi shing right, from the status of common property to commodity, has turned out to be one of the most contentious issues associated with ITQs in Iceland.
- Helgason and Pálsson (1998: 129) Fisheries privatization policies remake the social and ecological relationships in fi shing. Th e shift s generated by resource privatization have wider impacts on communities, cultures, and economies. Th e pattern of rural-to-urban migration of fi shing rights is linked to changes in rural coastal economies and cultures. Vertical integration and the increasing scale of fi shing in Iceland and other nations contribute to rural depopulation. For example, women in rural coastal communities in Iceland, who had once relied on steady income from fi sh processing plants are negatively impacted, as are crew and youth who may not easily transition into reproducing the social life of fi shing communities (Karlsdóttir 2008; Skaptadóttir 2000) . Anna Karlsdóttir (2008) discusses how such policies can infl uence the ways in which people defi ne their identities and social roles that can have far-reaching social impacts, potentially damaging the moral fabric of communities.
Because ITQ fi sheries redefi ne successful fi shermen-leading to professionalization of the fl eet, full-time engagements, and a favoring of those with access to capital-the structure and make-up of coastal communities can shift . Empirical studies of the impacts of ITQs suggest that the values of fi shing change when quotas are implemented. Anita Maurstad (2000) describes the important distinction between "capitalistic" fi shermen, privileged by ITQ management, and other small-boat fi shermen who may only fi sh when they need income. Similarly Anthony Davis (1996) describes the varying motivations for fi shing contrasting those of "accumulation-" versus "livelihood-" focused fi shermen. In small indigenous communities in Alaska, there is evidence that individualization and competitiveness become more common aft er fi shing rights become commodifi ed and marketized, and "lifestyle" fi shermen who do not seek profi ts from fi shing become marginalized in these systems (Carothers 2008 . Th ese shift s in values and relationships oft en transform community structure as in the example of ITQs in New Zealand fostering new competitive relationships in opposition to traditional Maori social relationships (McCormack 2010) .
For indigenous cultures, ITQs can represent another alienation process in a long history of colonialism. For example, Maori participation in commercial fi shing in New Zealand prior to ITQs was primarily a part-time, but vital, source of income (Memon and Cullen 1992) . Th e 1992 Fisheries Claims Act defi ned the commercial and customary use rights of Maori peoples as separate legal, economic and cultural categories. Th is dichotomization did not accurately refl ect the reality of contemporary indigenous fi shing cultures and economies (McCormack 2007 (McCormack , 2010 ) that employed mixed motivations (i.e., fi shing for food, health and healing, cultural practice, education, income) for fi shing participation. Th e reduction of fi shing practices to either commercial or customary can mean a loss of authority over livelihood and work decisions, a decreased affi liation and identifi cation with ancestral resources, and may undermine attachments to place (McCormack 2007 (McCormack , 2010 . Similarly in Alaska, subsistence-based commu-nities that mix commercial and subsistence productive systems have oft en been constrained by privatized fi shing rights (Carothers 2010; Reedy-Maschner 2010) .
Resisting the Reframing and Remaking of Fishery Systems
If we do not want to see our marine resources and related communities, cultures, and jobs disappear, then we would do well to learn from our past lessons.
- Fujita and Bonzon (2006: 312) Processes of commodifi cation and marketization that enable massive wealth transfer encourage accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) . Many fi shermen and fi shing communities have been alienated from fi shing livelihoods through processes of commodifi cation and marketization of fi shery access rights. However, these processes have also generated much resistance, both discursively-resisting the dominant ideas about privatization that have come to frame fi shery systems by creating and circulating challenging discourses, and materially-in some instances securing noncommodifi ed and nonalienable access rights to marine-based livelihoods. Increasingly, environmental, economic, and management discourses of privatization gain power in their ability to defi ne away alternatives. As a result, the ability to articulate and enroll supporters for other framings of fi sheries problems and goals is further constrained (Bourdieu 1998) . As dominant discourses gain a monopoly on the power to name and defi ne, those marginalized by the processes of enclosure become increasingly portrayed as irrational users (e.g., livelihood fi shermen) or unproductive, redundant, expendable labor (e.g., skilled crew members). However, those irrational and redundant users have been vocal in this resistance to fi sheries privatization.
Th ose aff ected by ITQs have reframed discourse. Fishermen and communities across the globe use explicit expressions of values of fairness and equity to critique the remaking of human-marine relations resulting from privatization processes. Helgason and Pálsson (1997) , for example, explore how fi shermen and others placed the privatization of their public fi sheries resource in a moral language of theft , profi teering, and feudal inequality. In the United States and Canada, the development of a diverse but collective voice of resistance is repoliticizing privatization discourses and processes (Butler 2008; Carothers 2008) .
Th ose aff ected by ITQs have also taken legal action. In New Zealand, for example, ITQs promoted resolution of Maori customary and commercial fi shing rights (Bourassa and Strong 2000; Memon and Kirk 2011) . As the eventual result of the 2004 Maori Fisheries Act, all 57 Maori iwi (tribal entities) own quota in perpetuity, totaling over 50 percent of the total quota (Dewees 2008) . However, these rights to quota are not without diffi culty, as this comanagement still operates under an ITQ framework (Batstone and Sharp 1999) , and there are still issues regarding access to fi sh for rural employment. Many iwi lease their quota, so it is still hard for Maori to benefi t from employment in fi shing and fi sh processing (Memon and Kirk 2011) . Dewees (1997: 105) notes that although the Maori now control a large proportion of fi shing rights in New Zealand, many Maori informants were of the "general opinion that ITQs were not compatible with their beliefs about fi sheries management … due to the Maori emphasis on collective rather than individual focus for distribution of benefi ts. "
Opposition and resistance to ITQs has led to legal action in Canada, Iceland, Norway, and the United States among other nations. Historical use, continued dependence, and shift in ownership resulting from ITQs were factors that infl uenced the Supreme Court of Canada to rule that the government must provide First Nations "improved access to fi shery resources" (Copes and Pálsson 2000: 3) . Th e Sami Parliament contested the implementation of vessel quotas in Norway in 1990 and continues to fi ght for indigenous rights to fi sh (Davis and Jentoft 2001; Jentoft and Karlsen 1996) . Similarly in the U.S., indigenous fi shing tribes in Alaska have used the courts to argue that ITQs violate aboriginal rights to fi sh (Carothers 2011) . Th e United National Human Rights Committee ruled in late 2007 that the existing Icelandic fi sheries law based on ITQs violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Iceland. Th e case, based on an act of resistance in 2001 by two fi shermen fi shing without quota, had also been tried in the Icelandic Supreme Court and, like similar cases that came before it, questioned the constitutionality of the ITQ system with regards to discrimination and the right to work (Einarsson 2011) . "ITQ provisions have discriminated in favor of particular groups in the fi shery, allowing them substantial wealth benefi ts from the public fi shery resource, at the expense of others" (Copes and Pálsson 2000: 3) .
Th e emerging disparity between theories guiding ITQ implementation and on-the-ground realities of fi sheries and fi shing livelihoods has led to several instances of changes made aft er implementation to ameliorate negative eff ects of quota system, oft entimes specifi cally for the purpose of addressing considerations of access and equity. In partial response to contested fi shing rights and quota consolidation in Iceland, a separate small boat quota system was implemented for those who fi sh only with handlines or longlines. In addition, in 2009, the Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries instituted a "coastal fi sheries" option, in which fi shers are allowed to catch a certain amount of the total allowable catch (totaling 6,000 tons in 2010) without quota, under certain restrictions such as season, a daily weight limit, gear, and boat size. Although there are examples from Iceland of towns adapting to loss of fi shing rights by reoutfi tting boats for tourism operations (Einarsson 2009) , and women coping with loss of processing plant jobs by creating handicraft business (Skaptadóttir 2000) , "coastal fi shing" off ers hope of fi sheries reengagement to places with limited employment and is deemed successful by many in small coastal communities that had been drained of quota (Einarsson 2011) . New Zealand implemented an annual catch entitlement in 2001 that allows for fi shing inshore without needing to own quota, under certain restrictions (Stewart and Callagher 2011) . Th e United States implemented a community purchase option for small communities in Alaska that were otherwise unable to access fi shing rights (Carothers 2011; Langdon 2008) .
Bonnie McCay (2004) concludes that resistance to ITQ governance has brought about adaptations to these programs that can enhance community-based fi sheries management. Property mechanisms can make secure the resource rights of indigenous groups like the Maori and Canadian First Nations. Similarly, the Community Development Quota program implemented in western Alaska in 1992 utilized a quota system to allocate a portion of fi shing rights to small indigenous communities who did not participate in the industrial fi sheries of the Bering Sea (Mansfi eld 2008; NRC 1999b) . It is clear that countries once considered leaders in quota management design are making changes to alleviate negative aspects of these privatization programs, both in response to legal challenges and to provide alternative opportunities for rural and indigenous fi sheries that have been largely constrained by privatization. Th e necessity of these amendments should lend cautionary notes to recent enthusiasm for continued privatization of fi shing rights.
Concluding Th oughts
Fishery systems are complex. Simplistic stories about the tragedy of the commons and kids and milkshakes are not appropriate metaphors to guide thinking about these systems. Many cultures, communities, and economies continue to depend on access to fi shery resources, yet across the globe privatization of fi shery systems is remaking these systems in ways that oft en inhibit alternative economies and cultural logics. Fishery system sustainability depends on sustaining cultural and economic pluralism and securing resource rights for coastal residents (McGoodwin 1990) . Th is article has explored how the privatization of fi sheries access rights discursively and materially remakes human-marine relationships across diverse regions. Th e economic theories, capitalist cultural logics, and large-scale experimentations that have led to the privatization of fi shing access for maximizing potential profi ts from common property fi sheries now has a fortyyear history to review. Many of the common outcomes of privatization are expected: consolidation of fi shing fl eets, concentration of wealth, increasing effi ciencies of vessels and vertically integrated fi rms, and the rural-to-urban migration of fi shing rights. Others such as the solidification of classes of fi shing participants, shift s in the relative earnings and power of these classes, changes in fi shing practices, and transitions in fi shing communities are perhaps less perceptible without detailed study. Th e economics literature that fi rst promoted these policies had a narrow goal-maximize aggregate potential profi ts. Privatization of fi shing rights for the economic goal of maximizing profi ts has been shown to oft en remake fi shery systems in the image of capital production, to the detriment of alternative economic and cultural logics that typify a diversity of fi shing communities worldwide currently struggling to resist these changes.
Environmental logics that increasingly redefi ne rationales for the privatization of fi shing rights (and related marine spaces) for resource conservation and ecosystem stewardship, as well as other social goals, have enrolled a broader network of supporters who espouse a diversity of values (e.g., Ecotrust 2011) . Th is diversity opens up new opportunities for resistance. 3 Some fi shers and fi shing communities are forming networks to better resist capitalist restructuring and facilitate pluralism (e.g., Community Fisheries Network 2012). Privatization processes are being reimagined in environmental and community discourses to accommodate goals other than maximized wealth generation. Marketizing and commodifying fi shing rights, central for profi t generation goals, are being challenged as more people advocate for the inalienability of resource rights and the inherent right to fi shing livelihoods. How these new environmental and social logics are redefi ning privatization processes and reshaping fi shery systems warrants more attention. Ⅲ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Th is work was funded in part by the National Science Foundation (Arctic Sciences, Grant No. 1023619) and Fulbright and Leifur Eiríksson Scholarships. We thank several Kodiak fi shermen who were interviewed as part of the "Social Transitions in Kodiak Fisheries" project and informed the development of this article. We are grateful for space provided by the University of Alaska Fairbanks Kodiak Seafood and Marine Science Center and the Blönduós Academic Center. We also want to thank the three anonymous reviews for their helpful comments. All errors or misrepresentations are solely our own. Ⅲ COURTNEY CAROTHERS is an assistant professor of fi sheries at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. She is an environmental anthropologist whose research program focuses on understanding social, cultural, and economic diversity in fi shing communities and explores ways to sustain that diversity into the future. In one central area of study, she explores the material, social, and symbolic shift s in fi shing livelihoods as fi shing rights become privatized. In another, she partners with indigenous communities in the Arctic to study social-ecological change and subsistence ways of life. Her specifi c areas of expertise include: political ecology; resource enclosure and privatization; indigenous knowledge, science studies, and politics of knowledge; subsistence, mixed, and alternative economies; socio-ecological change; fi shery systems; and Alaska Native cultures. CATHERINE CHAMBERS is a doctoral fellow in the Marine Ecosystem Sustainability in the Arctic and Subarctic program at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. As a recipient of Fulbright and Leifur Eiríksson scholarships, she is currently conducting research through Hólar University College and the Blönduós Academic Center in Blönduós, Iceland. Her dissertation research focuses on subarctic coastal communities and issues of access and participation in marine-based livelihoods. Ⅲ NOTES 1. Previous research is summarized in Carothers (2008 Carothers ( , 2010 Carothers ( , 2011 . Both authors are currently involved in an ethnographic study of experiences of fi sheries privatization and impacts on individual and community well-being in Kodiak, Alaska (National Science Foundation, Arctic Sciences, Grant No. 1023619, 2010 -2013 . Current ethnographic research exploring fi sheries privatization processes, among other changes in fi shing communities, is also being conducted in Iceland (Fulbright Scholarship, 2011 Leifur Eiríksson Scholarship, 2011 2. Safety is also becoming linked to ITQ management. When ITQ systems replace derby fi sheries, safety improvements oft en result (see Fina 2011; Hartley and Fina 2001) ; however, safety gains are realized because of the elimination of unsafe fi shery practices rather than the implementation of ITQ programs as such (see Lazrus et al. 2011 for a diverse range of perspectives on safety and ITQ implementation in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island crab fi sheries).
3. We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for making this important point.
